We experimentally investigate whether framing an individual-choice decision in a market setting results in a different outcome than when the decision is described in a context-free frame. We further explore whether the context effect is triggered by the frame itself or whether a richer descriptive content is required to establish familiarity with the decision-making environment. Understanding what constitutes context is central to formulating practical recommendations aiming to improve the quality of individual decisions. Our results show that framing a sequential search problem as selling houses leads to better decisions than a context-free frame. Manipulating whether or not the framed decision-making scenario includes a description of the house, which would be naturally available in a real estate market, does not impact the length of search or the total earnings.
INTRODUCTION
Economic rationality can often be observed in social and economic institutions that provide interactive experience within a particular context in which the decisions are made (see Plott 1987; Smith, 1962 and 1991) . However, a large fraction of individual decisionmaking experiments testing for rationality is context free and employs neutral framing. At the same time, empirical evidence points out that decisions, whether in an individual or strategic setting, are sensitive to framing (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; McNeil, Pauker, Sox & Tversky, 1982; Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987) and that embedding a decision-making problem in a context can improve the quality of decisions (e.g., Eger & Dickhaut, 1982; Griggs & Cox, 1982) . 1 The ability to make better decisions in context can be explained by the dual-processing theory. Dual-processing theory proposes that most daily decisions are made by associating a new situation with existing knowledge in similar experiences, rather than forming new knowledge and information for each new experience (Kahneman, 2003) . People use existing schemas that contain effective strategies constructed from previous experiences to make decisions. A schema is a system of organizing and perceiving new information, which is then encoded as default assumptions about the world. Schemas form mental structures that describe how the world works, and how we interact with the world (see Bower & Cirilo, 1985; Dimaggio, 1997; Narvaez & Bock, 2002 , for more details).
2 For instance, when someone holds a schema that maximizing profit is the best approach to make decisions, she will consistently re-apply this schema in various economic situations. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) and Jehiel (2005) propose arguments related to schema activation that effective contexts work through memory cues from past experience. People with existing experience in the presented context can evoke this past experience to guide their behavior in the current task.
Since in everyday life virtually all decisions are made within a context, it is crucial to understand the link between the amount of information needed in a context in order to activate a schema and change the behavior. We study whether framing an individual-choice decision in a market setting results in a different outcome than when the decision is described in a neutral (context-free) frame. We further explore whether schema activation is triggered by the frame itself or whether a richer descriptive content is required to establish familiarity with the decision-making environment in order to activate the schema. Understanding what constitutes context is central to formulating practical recommendations aiming to improve the quality of individual decisions. It is important to note that certain contexts cannot be created or easily replicated in the lab, however one can frame (label) the decision and provide additional information about the environment to invoke a particular context and enhance the link between the laboratory and every day life decision-making. 3 We explore our questions in a sequential search task, known as the secretary problem (Gardner, 1960) , in which individuals decide whether to accept the presented offer or whether to keep searching for a better one. Within this setting we frame the decisions as selling houses and manipulate whether or not the decision-making scenario includes a description of the house, which would be naturally available in a real estate market. Note that, in reality, buying or selling a house do often follow the processes of secretary problem. The experimental design ensures that at no stage our participants receive information regarding the distribution of offers or the optimal (= highest) offer, which is crucial for a clean identification of the source of decision variation. Our findings show that decisions framed as selling houses, irrespectively of whether house descriptions are available or not, result in higher earnings and are closer to the optimal amount of search (approximated by numerical methods) than neutrally-framed (and thus context-free) decisions. Our experiment thus provides evidence that schema can be activated solely with framing and that no additional descriptive information is necessary.
The contribution of our study also has a methodological aspect. For certain research questions in social sciences and economics in particular, the lack of context in subject instructions is desirable as the sole focus on induced values leads to more control over the data generating process than simulating alleged circumstances would (Smith, 1976) . Using loaded language and engaging participants in "roleplay," runs the risk that home-grown values and preconceived notions of how one "should" behave in a given emotionallycharged scenario will dominate the pecuniary incentives (see Oaxaca, 1989 and Friedman & Sunder, 1994 for a discussion; Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat & Smith, 1994 and Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1996 for early experimental studies framing ultimatum game and dictator game decisions as market interactions; and Alekseev, Charness & Gneezy, 2017 for a survey of using contextual instructions in economics experiments). At the same time, it is crucial to recognize that the lack of context itself might result in loss of control, for example when comparing the behavior of participants from different populations and attributing the observed difference to "culture" or "group preferences," without properly understanding the context that the subjects might self-impose to help them interpret the experimental scenario and incentives. Ultimately, whether context enhances or diminishes control depends on the research question and deciding whether or not to implement it or not is an important design issue. Our main methodological contribution to this debate stems from our observation that framing itself is sufficient to generate context in an individual decision-making environment and providing evidence that a house-selling frame results in longer search and higher payoffs. We investigate this hypothesis by employing a context that few of our participants had past experience with: selling houses. We argue that a context that has (likely) never been experienced can still improve decisions and facilitate learning by activating schema created from "similar" contexts experienced in our daily lives.
RELATIONSHIP TO THE LITERATURE
Many decision-making situations are sequential in life; such decisions often need to be made immediately and in certain instances cannot be revisited. This type of sequential decision-making situation displays the features of the secretary problem. 4 The classical secretary problem has been specified in the following way (Gardner & Mathematical Association of America, 2009) . A known number of n candidates is presented randomly in a sequence. The decision-maker must either accept or reject the presented candidate immediately and the decision cannot be recalled.
5 A positive payoff is earned only if she chooses the best overall candidate. The optimal decision rule of the classical version of the secretary problem allows the decision-maker to maximize the probability of finding the best candidate. The decision rule states that the decision-maker should reject the first n/e (≈0.37 as n approaches infinity) of the candidates and then accept a candidate who is better than any of the previously rejected candidates (see Lindley, 1961; Gilbert & Mosteller, 1966 for a detailed proof). The chance of finding the best candidate increases to approximately 58% as n approaches infinity (Gilbert & Mosteller, 1966) when the distribution of the quality of candidates is available and known. However, often it is not and must be inferred during the process itself.
In Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) , the decision rule is based on assuming that only the relative (ordinal) rank of each candidate is known, rather the objective (cardinal) value of each candidate. There exist also other variations of how payoffs in the secretary problem are calculated; e.g. in Seale & Rapoport (1997) only the best choice results in a positive payoff whereas in Bearden et al. (2006) payoffs are dependant on rank. Teodorescu, Sang, and Todd (2018) implement objective values in an experiment and point out their several advantages, namely the ecological validity and the ability of researchers to observe the learning effect as well as behavioral strategies for different values associated with candidates. Angelovski and Güth (2019) use dynamic modelling to calculate the optimal decision rule for objective values when the distribution is known. In a subsequent experiment they then find that people stop searching too early. Early stopping behavior is actually a frequent finding in experiments on the variation of the secretary problem (e.g. Zwick, Rapoport, Lo & 4 Ferguson (1989) and Freeman (1983) for historical reviews. 5 Recall in the current paper refers to the ability to withdraw any previously made decision. Muthukrishnan, 2003) . While many of these experiments frame the decisions in a particular context (e.g., interviewing candidates for a position or search for new apartments) and present a specific content (e.g., relative rank of the current candidate with respect to the already interviewed candidates or the relative rank of the current apartment and the probability of successfully recalling a previously rejected apartment), we are unaware of any studies explicitly exploring whether framing exacerbates or alleviates early stopping behavior. Cox and Oaxaca (1989) investigate a context-free job search problem that could be considered a variant of the secretary problem with multiple relaxed assumptions. In particular, in their experiment the participants are informed about the distribution of offers prior to making decisions, and use search with replacements, meaning that the same draw can re-appear in later search. While this reduces the complexity of the search task, Cox and Oaxaca still report early stopping behavior in their experiment. Although their paper discusses the importance of avoiding emotive terms in a sequential job search task (for their research question), the study does not include a context treatment that would permit a conclusion as to whether sequential search is influenced by context.
A type of context effect -the order in which the offers are presented -is experimentally investigated by Corbin, Olson and Abbondanza (1975) in the classical secretary problem. Corbin et al. (1975) show that the probability of finding the highest offer is influenced by how the offers are presented and also by the size of the offers experienced in the sequence. People are more likely to find the highest offer in an initial decrease followed by an increase pattern than in a monotonically increasing pattern. People are also more likely to find the highest offer when experiencing a large range of offers than small or medium range. This earlier research therefore suggests that the quality of sequential search decisions might be susceptible to how the offers are presented.
Finally, in a study related to ours, Palley and Kremer (2014) investigate the effect of rank feedback when the secretary problem is framed as real property agents searching for an apartment. Palley and Kremer find that when the actual value of each offer and the distribution of offers are presented, people search more than when only the relative rank is available. Therefore, the amount of information available may potentially influence the length of search.
DIFFERENT DECISIONS UNDER DIFFERENT CONTEXT FRAMES
The human brain is often thought to be the result of an evolutionary process to resolve problems and enhance survival (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992) . The brain enables a collection of cognitive mechanisms that guide our behavior and decision-making. As suggested by schema activation, invoking a particular context while making a decision is possibly one of these mechanisms. In fact, in a recent study Thunström, Cherry, McEvoy and Shogren (2016) find that people actively seek out richer context to facilitate their decisions in the dictator game. Ample empirical evidence also shows that framing a decision-making problem in a particular context might result in different choices from a context-free (neutral) frame.
A long line of research has found that decisions change under different frames (e.g., Levin & Gaeth, 1988; Duchon, Dunegan & Barton, 1989; Gamliel & Peer, 2010 ). An early study of the issue is that of Kahneman and Tversky (1984) , who explore how different phrasing with the same outcome affected people's preference in hypothetical life-and-death decision-making scenarios. The decision is presented to participants either with positive framing, for example, 2 of 3 people would die or with negative framing, 1 of 3 people would live. They find that although the outcome is the same in both scenarios, a decision made with the positively framed scenario often differed from that made with the negatively framed one.
Dual-processing theory has been proposed to explain why different decisions result from how the problem is framed (e.g., Kahneman, 2003; Evans, 2008) , emphasizing that the decision-making process relies on both intuitive/heuristic and analytic/executive processes. System one involves implicit (subconscious) processing that uses intuitive and heuristic forms of reasoning that operate in most of our everyday reasoning and decision-making. It is a domain-specific and contextualised, fast, and automatic responding requires very little effort. System two involves explicit (conscious) processing; these analytic/executive operations tend to be slow, controlled, serial, and effortful (De Neys, 2006) . The context effect can be caused by different decision-making schemas belonging to system one. Some schemas are activated chronically due to the regular contact with environmental context (Freeman, 2007) . For example, when an individual learns from repeatedly looking for a car-parking space that is closest to the destination, she learns that a certain way facilitates finding the best parking space, and other ways do not. These schemas are activated involuntarily. They are formed from previous experiences and are then used to organize or integrate new information (see Bower & Cirilo, 1985; Dimaggio, 1997; Narvaez & Bock, 2002 , for a more detailed discussion on schemas). Once schemas are formed, they operate constantly in the brain and are activated by stimuli that resemble the stimuli that were present when the schema was first created (Higgins & Chaires, 1980 ; also see Narvaez, & Bock, 2002) . To return to the previous search example if the experiences of finding carparking spaces couple with experiences in searching for the best car to buy within a given price range, the brain may form a fuller mental model of how to make sequential search decisions generally. This may then be activated when a similar situation, for example, finding an apartment, arises. Heider and Simmel (1944) find evidence to support the hypothesis of re-applying existing schema to explain a new experience. In their experiment, the participants watch a short animated film. The film has a motionless large square with a door that opens and closes in one side. First, a big triangle appeared inside the square, then a small triangle and circle appeared. As the door flapped open and shut, the geometric figures slid around the screen. After ninety seconds or so, the small triangle and the small circle disappeared, and the big triangle breaks down the big square. 6 After the participants watch the animated film, they are asked to describe what they saw. Only 3 of 114 participants report seeing geometric shapes moving around a screen. The majority report a narrative and attribute agency and intent to the shapes: for example, a romance story between the small triangle and the small circle, the big triangle is the angry parent who wants to separate them, and so on. This experiment demonstrates that people can explain a new situation using a similar, existing mental structure or schema. Although people may feel they are experiencing novelty every day, the novelty is perceived and interpreted by existing schemas without consciously being processed by the brain (Wegner & Wheathey, 1999) .
EVIDENCE OF MAKING BETTER DECISIONS WITH CONTEXT
Just as a schema can be activated through the same or a similar stimulus encountered in previous experiences, making decisions in a context allows us to effectively resolve problems and make decisions without starting from scratch every time. For example, experimentation on the Wason selection task, testing deductive reasoning. demonstrates how context enhances people's ability to solve problems. In the Wason selection a set of four cards is placed on a table, where each card has a number on one side and a letter on the other side. The visible faces of the cards show A, D, 4 and 7. Which card(s) must be turned over in order to test whether the proposition that if a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other side, is true?
Only 5 % of the participants are able to solve the context-free problem correctly (Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1970) . A drastic increase in correct answers is reported in versions involving a social exchange to detect cheaters (e.g., Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides et al., 2010) and cross-cultural experiments with the SchiWiar of Ecuadorian Amazonia (Sugiyama et al., 2002) . Griggs and Cox (1982) report that when people are asked to solve the Wason problem as a drinking-age problem, 73% of them are able to solve it correctly, suggesting that in some instances context aids understanding of the task and reduces confusion among partipants. In this form of the problem, the task framed the problem as a police officer who is ensuring drinking-age regulations are being followed in a bar. The participants are presented with 4 cards, each with information about one person in a bar. One side of a card tells a person's age and on the other side is what the person is drinking. The task is to identify the card(s) that violate this rule: If a person is drinking beer, then the person must be over 19 years of age. Pollard and Evans (1987) argue that two different aspects that change between the context-free problem and the context-framed problem can potentially contribute to better performance. For example, the drinking-age problem provides content (drinks and age), as well as the context or scenario (policeman checking patrons' age in a bar), within which this content is relevant. Pollard and Evans demonstrate that both the relevant content and context are necessary to facilitate an increase in accurate responses. However, they suggest that context may be a stronger contributor to people's performance than content, a claim our experiment is able to verify by observing the marginal effect caused by providing additional informational content on the top of framing. There are two other major differences between our experiment and that of Pollard and Evans. First, Pollard and Evans employ a reasoning task while our experiment employs a sequential search task. Second, in Pollard and Evans the participants are not incentivized for their performance, whereas the decisions in our experiment have monetary consequences.
7 Economic experiments also demonstrate that context affects incentivized behavior. Alekseev et al. (2017) survey the literature and come to the conclusion that context often but not invariably improves performance with the improvement being more likely if the task requires sophisticated reasoning. (While the survey did not contain any secretary problem studies, the task seems to qualify as requiring sophisticated reasoning.)
Our contribution to this line of research stems from varying the amount of context provided which is critical to our understanding of schema activation. The aforementioned study by Thunström et al. (2016) suggests that people endogenously seek information which then in turn alters their behavior. A richer descriptive information may potentially be more effective in activating the appropriate schema and facilitating better quality decisions. Thus, apart from extending the analysis of context effects to the area of sequential search, our study addresses a previously unexplored link between the amount of information necessary to generate a context effect. In what follows, we experimentally identify whether framing itself is capable of improving search decisions or whether a richer description of the environment aids people to extend their search closer to the optimal level. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
We design an experiment to analyze the effect of context on sequential search activity in the secretary problem in which the participants earn payoffs based on the offers they accept. 9 In particular, we identify whether framing of sequential search as selling houses results in different behavior than when the search is described in a context-free manner and whether a richer descriptive content is required to generate the context effect. An important feature of our experiment is employing a context that likely only few of our participants (if any, due to their age) had past experience with. The experiment therefore presents a conservative test of our hypotheses. If we observe that a context that has never been experienced can still improve decisions by activating schema created from similar market contexts of being a seller, employing a context that one has direct experience with is likely to yield even a stronger effect.
The experiment consists of three treatments implemented in an across-subject design: No Frame, House Frame, and House Frame with Info. There is no monetary search cost. The offers are presented in experimental currency units with the exchange rate of 1000 ECU = 1 NZD, announced at the beginning of the experiment. The experiment, programmed and conducted with zTree software (Fischbacher, 2007) , consists of 2 practice rounds and 10 cumulatively paid rounds. In each round, there are 20 available offers, distribution of which is unknown to participants. The offers are identical across the three treatments (see Table 1 for details). Each sequence of offers, including those in the practice rounds, was generated in MS Excel by randomly sampling from an interval of the average house price (in thousands of NZD) in a different Christchurch suburb plus/minus the standard deviation for that suburb. 10 The house transactions took place in October 2014. The transaction information was obtained from the Quotable Value Ltd. database (qv.co.nz). Notes: Sequence optimal position = the position with the highest price in the implemented sequence, see Appendix B for details; Sequence optimal offer = the highest offer value in each round, see Appendix B for details; Predicted optimal position = the stopping position predicted by the optimal decision rule (the decision rule which yields the highest earning), see Appendix C for details; Predicted optimal offer = the offer at the position predicted by the optimal decision rule, see Appendix C for details. Min. = the lowest offer in each round. Average offer = the average offer in the implemented sequence for each round. Std. D. = the standard deviation of 20 price offers in each round.
The participants in the No Frame treatment receive the following instructions about their task. Note that there is no mention of a house, its description, or any additional information. The full instructions are provided in Appendix A.1. Finally, the House Frame with Info treatment employs identical instructions to the House Frame one. The only difference between these two treatments is that in the House Frame with Info treatment a description of a house, consisting of the floor area, the number of bedrooms, suburb and year the house was built in, is presented prior to the price offer. Each round features a different house description. The house descriptions were also obtained from the Quotable Value database.
We compare the participants' decisions based on the stopping position and their total earnings. We assume that the participants are risk-neutral decision-makers who aim to maximize their expected payoffs. The first hypothesis, formulated with reference to experiments on the Wason selection task, is that people make better decisions when presented with a context than without. Theoretically, this would be because having a context allows one to better assess the situation and access existing schema constructed from a similar experience, for example, selling an object in everyday life. According to previous psychology research, when no context is available, the person might experience difficulty in determining what schema to apply and the chance of applying an inappropriate schema is increased. Assuming we replicate early stopping behavior in our experimental set up, we expect the House Frame and House Frame with Info treatments to produce higher total earnings and longer search than the No Frame treatment.
Hypothesis 1: People search longer and obtain higher total earnings when decisions are framed as selling houses (both with and without additional information) than when they are framed neutrally.
It is possible that having a fairly complete description of the house -for example, floor area, number of bedrooms, the year the house was built -is also critical in activating a useful schema.
We therefore expect participants to search longer and their total earnings to be higher in the House Frame with Info treatment than in the House Frame.
Hypothesis 2: People search longer and obtain higher total earnings when decisions are framed as selling houses and more content-relevant information is available than when there is no such information.
At the same time, we recognize that having to process additional information in the House Frame with Info treatment could be distracting to participants and might result in more noise.
PROCEDURES AND PARTICIPANTS
The experiment was conducted at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand. The payoff protocol was single-blind, meaning that the experimenter was able to match participant decisions to their identity. The participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) . After arriving at the lab, the participants were randomly assigned to a cubicle and read the instructions (provided in Appendix A.1 -3) at their own pace. Any questions were answered in private. A total of 137 students participated in the experiment: 46 in the No Frame treatment, 43 in House Frame, and 48 in House Frame with Info. A session lasted on average 45 minutes and the participants earned NZD 12.10 on average.
SIMULATION
What is the optimal decision rule for a payoff-maximizing risk-neutral decisionmaker in our variation of the secretary problem? Since the distribution of offers in our experiment is unknown to participants, we conduct a simulation that allows to evaluate the performance of different decision rules. Each simulation compares the payoffs resulting from 20 different decision rules (as there was a maximum of 20 offers; each decision rule prescribes how many offers to reject in order to learn about the distribution, followed by accepting the next highest offer), which contain all possible stopping positions (i.e., an individual stops the search by accepting the n th offer in a given sequence; where 1 ≤ n ≤ 20). Each simulation iteration generates a set of 20 random offers in the same way as the actual offers used in the experiment were generated. Once a set of offers has been generated, the offers are (implicitly) ordered from the highest to lowest and assigned a rank within this particular order. These offer values and the rank for each offer are recorded to test the performance of each decision rule. The simulation runs separately for each round with 1.2 million iterations.
We compare the performance of all 20 possible decision rules using both the average payoffs (in ECUs) they yield and the frequency of each decision rule finding the optimal offer (in %). The average payoff statistic indicates which decision rule yields the highest payoff. The optimal offer frequency statistic shows which decision rule finds the optimal price offers most frequently. According to the simulation, the decision rule to "Accept the next highest offer after seeing 4 offers" yields the highest average payoff of 524.3 ECUs (see Figure 1) . The decision rule "Accept the next highest offer after seeing 7 offers" finds the most optimal offers as presented in Figure 2 , just as the optimal decision rule of the classical version of the secretary problem (20/e = 7.4 offers). However, the decision rule "Accept the next highest offer after seeing 7 offers" yields only 518.9 ECUs on average. The simulation thus indicates that, when any accepted offer generates a positive payoff (as opposed to only the best one as in the classical secretary problem) and the goal is to maximize the payoff, it might be better to stop the search sooner (i.e., accept an earlier offer) than prescribed by the solution to the classical secretary problem. 
RESULTS
First, we describe the summary statistics and test our hypotheses. Then, we examine whether there is a repetition effect found in any of the treatments, namely whether participants make better decisions in the latter rounds than in the earlier rounds. Finally, we present correlation results between the amount of search and total earnings.
There are two dependent variables: the amount of search exerted, i.e. the position in the sequence where the participant stops searching and accepts the offer (henceforth stopping position), and the amount of money the participant earned, i.e. the cumulative sum of 10 accepted offers in ECUs (henceforth total earnings). The summary statistics relating to these two dependent variables are presented in Table 2. highest offer after seeing 7 offers" has the highest total earnings and "Accept the next highest offer after seeing 9 offers" finds the most optimal offers in the sequences used in our experiment (see Appendix C). 7338.9 580.7 < 0.001
Sequence optimal* 9228.0
Predicted optimal** 7930.0 *Sequence optimal refers to the actual optimal position/offer from the sequences implemented in the experiment. ** The predicted result from applying the optimal decision rule to the sequences implemented in the experiment (see Appendix C for more detail). This serves as a benchmark only, not for a direct comparison to participants' decisions.
*** The result of Tukey HSD post hoc pairwise comparisons between two treatments; the small numbers in parentheses indicate the compared treatment. Notes: SD presents the standard deviation, df refers to the degree of freedom. Result 1: The house-selling frame (with or without information) leads to more search than no frame. The house-description information has no effect on the amount of search when the task is framed as selling houses. The analysis of variance show a significant main effect of treatment on the average total earnings, as presented in Table 2 Panel B. Tukey HSD post hoc tests confirm that the participants in the House Frame treatment received significantly higher total earnings than the participants in the No Frame treatment (p = 0.005, hypothesis 1). The participants in the House Frame with Info treatment also received higher total earnings than the participants in the No Frame treatment (p < 0.001, hypothesis 1). There is no significant difference in total earnings between the House Frame and House Frame with Info treatments (p = 0.84, hypothesis 2). All results are robust to using a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test; see Appendix D for details.
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Result 2:
The house-selling frame (with or without information) leads to higher total earnings than no frame. The house-description information has no effect on the total earnings when the task is framed as selling houses.
REPETITION EFFECT
STOPPING POSITION
To examine whether the performance of participants improves with experience, we contrast participants' stopping positions in the first half of the session (rounds 1 -5) with stopping positions in the second half of the session (rounds 6 -10). We conduct a repeatedmeasures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with session halves (first vs. second) as a withinsubject factor and treatments (No Frame, House Frame, and House Frame with Info) as a between-subject factor. The analysis of variance results, averaged across treatments and presented in Table 3 , show a significant main effect of session halves. Participants stopped significantly earlier in the second half (M = 9.8) than in the first half (M = 11.9) of the session. There is also a statistically significant (p = 0.007) interactive effect of the treatments and session halves. 1.0 position) than the sequence optimal position in the first half and were even further away (on average by 1.6 positions less) from the sequence optimal position in the second half of the session. 13 The participants in House Frame and House Frame with Info treatments stopped search closer to the sequence optimal position than in the No Frame treatment in both the first and second halves of the session, as shown in Figure 3 , providing further evidence that framing improves the quality of search decisions.
Result 3:
The house-selling frame with information leads to more search than no frame in the latter rounds. The house selling frame without information and no frame yield similar amount of search throughout the entire session. Similarly, the house-description information has no effect on the amount of search throughout the entire session when the task is framed as selling-houses. 
TOTAL EARNINGS
We next examine whether experience leads to higher total earnings. We compute the total earnings for each participant across the first half (rounds 1 -5) and second half (rounds 6 -10) of the session and conduct a repeated-measures ANOVA. The analysis detects a significant main effect of session halves in total earnings with participants decisions leading to higher total earnings in the second half of the session, but the interaction effect of the session halves and treatments is not significant (p = 0.21). The detailed results are presented in Table 3 . Result 4: The house-selling frame (with or without information) leads to higher total earnings than no frame in the latter rounds. The house-description information has no effect on total earnings in the entire session when the task is framed as selling houses.
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PEARSON CORRELATION ANALYSIS
We use Pearson correlation analysis to examine the relationship between the average stopping positions, the total earnings, and the optimal offer frequency. The average stopping position is obtained by averaging the 10 actual stopping position for each participant. The total earnings are calculated for each participant by adding up the 10 offers she accepted. The optimal offer frequency shows the percentage of accepting the optimal offer (out of all accepted offers) by a participant.
Unsurprisingly, we find a positive significant correlation between the frequency in which the optimal offer is accepted and the total earnings for all three treatments (r = 0.57, p < 0.001). This is expected because the optimal offer is the highest offer in each round. Accepting the optimal offer in more rounds will therefore result in higher total earnings. There is a large positive and significant correlation between the length of search and the size of the accepted offer (r = 0.61, p < 0.001), as well as the frequency of accepted optimal offers (r = 0.24, p = 0.005). The longer the participants search, the more often they accept the optimal offers.Also, the longer the participants search, the higher are their total earnings. 
DISCUSSION
This study extends the empirical analysis of context effects to the domain of sequential search where the implemented task was framed as selling houses. We further contribute to the literature by exploring the link between the amount of information necessary to generate the context effect. Using a conservative experimental design, we show that even a context which only few of our participants were likely to have had past experience with can result in improved decisions.
The experiment confirms the hypothesis that the participants search longer and accept higher offers when the house selling frame is introduced as an experimental manipulation (hypothesis 1). This result is consistent with the conjecture that having a context can activate existing schemas that enhance decision-making ability, as previously found in reasoning task experiments. At the same time, we do not find an effect of providing additional context-specific information on participants decisions; framing itself appears to be sufficient to activate the relevant schema (hypothesis 2).
Previous research finds that people search more when less information is available (see e.g. Palley & Kremer, 2014 for evidence when the distribution of offers is known). However, this is not what we find in our data. There are at least two potential underlying causes for observing less search in a context-free setting. First, without a context, system one is unable to effectively associate a new experience with existing knowledge and strategies that the decision-maker has obtained from past experiences in a similar situation. This means that our participants might be forming their search strategy through trial and error, which is supported by higher standard deviations in the No Frame treatment. Second, it is possible that, without context, people are applying an inappropriate schema, an explanation potentially relevant from the methodological perspective as a large fraction of economics experiments is conducted without framing and in a context-free setting. It is not entirely clear whether participants always apply their own framing in such situations (Thunström et al., 2016 provide evidence for the dictator game), which could potentially lead to a loss of control over the data generating process. Whether people indeed apply their preferred framing to context-free tasks and whether the frequency of own-framing adoption interacts with certain design features, such as the complexity of the task, clearly deserves further investigation as it has fundamental methodological implications.
It is important to keep in mind the limitations of our study. Our experiment adopts a house-selling context to explore schema activation. As there is no general theory explaining the effect of context on decision-making, it is unknown what type of framing one should use to achieve a particular outcome, for example, to improve people's decisions to obtain higher earnings. From that perspective, the results of a house-selling frame may not generalize to other contexts, such as to the context of buying houses, or selling or buying cars. While the issues of whether context and framing effects carry over from one environment to another or whether they are task specific are outside the scope of our research question, we view them as promising future areas of research.
To conclude, our research adds to the existing literature on the importance of context in decision-making (e.g. Alekseev et al. 2017) . Our results extend the range of tasks requiring sophisticated reasoning, performance in which is improved by adding context, to include the secretary problem. Our results also show that once context is established, providing additional information in order to strengthen it does not appear to be critical.
APPENDIX A
A.1 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NO FRAME TREATMENT
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Overview
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any time, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. We ask that you not to talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please turn off your cell-phone and do not use the computer for any other purpose than your participation in the experiment requires. If you break these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.
You will participate in 10 rounds. In each round, you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a number. The numbers are randomly generated by the computer and available one at a time. Once a number is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If you accept the number, you receive the amount represented by the number (in experimental currency units, as will be explained below). All decisions are final. If you reject the number, the number will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected number. In total there are 20 numbers available; if you have not accepted a number prior to the 20 th number, you will be forced to accept the 20 th (i.e. the final) number. Therefore, make your decisions carefully.
There is no time limit on how long the numbers will be available for, so take as long as you need to evaluate each number.
Practice rounds
There will be two practice rounds. These practice rounds are there to help you become familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in these two practice rounds.
How payoffs are determined
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 1000 ECUs = 1 NZD Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when you leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn. 
Do you have any questions?
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice rounds, with no money payoffs. Then, you will make decisions in 10 rounds with money payoffs.
A.2 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE HOUSE FRAME TREATMENT
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Overview
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any time, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. We ask that you not to talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please turn off your cellphone and do not use the computer for any other purpose than your participation in the experiment requires. If you break these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.
You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each scenario, you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular house. You will be given a series of price offers for each scenario.The price offers are randomly generated by the computer and available one at a time. Once a price offer is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If you accept the price offer, the house will be sold at the price you accepted. All sales are final. If you reject the price offer, the offer will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected offer. In total there are 20 price offers available for each house; if you have not accepted an offer prior to the 20 th offer, you will be forced to accept the 20 th (i.e. the final) offer. Therefore, make your decisions carefully.
There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be available for, so take as long as you need to evaluate each offer.
Practice scenarios
There will be two practice scenarios. These practice scenarios are there to help you become familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in these two practice scenarios.
How payoffs are determined
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs).
1000 ECUs = 1 NZD Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when you leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn.
Your payoffs are determined as follows:
Total ECUs you earn = Accepted price offer for House 1 + Accepted price offer for House 2 + ….+ Accepted price offer for House 10
Example: Suppose you accepted the price offer 450 for House 1, 260 for House 2, 380 for House 3,…, 658 for House 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 450+260+380+…. +658.
Do you have any questions?
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios, with no money payoffs. Then, you will make decisions in 10 scenarios with money payoffs.
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A.3 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE HOUSE FRAME WITH INFO TREATMENT
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Overview
You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each scenario, you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular house. You will be given a brief description of the house that will be followed by a series of price offers. The price offers are randomly generated by the computer and available one at a time. Once a price offer is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If you accept the price offer, the house will be sold at the price you accepted. All sales are final. If you reject the price offer, the offer will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected offer. In total there are 20 price offers available for each house; if you have not accepted an offer prior to the 20 th offer, you will be forced to accept the 20 th (i.e. the final) offer. Therefore, make your decisions carefully.
Practice scenarios
How payoffs are determined
Do you have any questions?
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios, with no money payoffs. Then, you will make decisions in 10 scenarios with money payoffs. 
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